Jerusalem, 27 April, 2026 (TPS-IL) — The Israel Defense Forces failed to defend Kibbutz Holit during the Hamas-led attack of October 7, 2023, leaving residents to fend for themselves for nearly seven hours as terrorists overran the community, according to an official military investigation released more than two years after the events.
The probe found that a combination of operational confusion, breakdowns in command and control, and critical professional errors among responding forces led to what it described as a collapse of the military system in the area. “The IDF failed in its mission to protect the kibbutz and its residents,” the report stated, attributing the outcome primarily to a lack of preparedness for a large-scale, coordinated assault on multiple civilian communities.
Kibbutz Holit, a small agricultural community of about 225 residents located roughly 1.2 kilometers from the Gaza border, was effectively under Hamas control for six hours and 53 minutes, from shortly before 7 a.m. until early afternoon. During that time, dozens of terrorists moved from house to house, killing, abducting, and setting fire to buildings while residents and a small local security team fought back largely alone.
Thirteen civilians and two foreign workers were Killed In the kibbutz, while several others were abducted to the Gaza Strip. Some hostages were later released or returned in exchange deals, while others were killed in captivity. Three members of the security forces, including the community’s security coordinator, were also killed.
According to the investigation, the attack began with a barrage of rockets at 6:29 a.m., under which terrorists breached the border and advanced toward Israeli communities. Within minutes, local security personnel in Holit identified armed men approaching. By 6:59 a.m., attackers had blown a hole in the perimeter fence and entered the kibbutz.
Despite the arrival of some Israeli troops at the community’s entrance shortly after the infiltration began, they were unable to enter due to a locked gate and were soon redirected to other nearby combat zones amid widespread confusion. Reinforcements that reached the broader area lacked an accurate understanding of the situation inside the kibbutz, the report said, contributing to delays in mounting an effective response.
Command Confusion and Delayed Response
“The forces had the wrong picture of what was happening in the surrounding communities and therefore did not join them,” the investigation noted regarding one of the first units on the scene. In another case, commanders were criticized for failing to split their forces to both engage militants outside the kibbutz and reinforce the fighting within it.
The report stressed that these failures were not due to a lack of willingness to fight. “The commanders in the field strove for contact and wanted to engage,” it said, but pointed to “serious professional errors” and difficulties in forming a clear operational picture under rapidly evolving conditions.
As a result, the kibbutz’s small emergency squad — reportedly just four armed members at the time — faced around 60 to 100 attackers in multiple waves. Residents described carrying out rescue operations under fire, defending homes and neighbors, and in some cases confronting terrorists directly.
The investigation highlighted several acts of civilian bravery, including that of Rabbi Avi Korin, who was killed while attempting to stop the attackers, and his deputy, who continued fighting alone for hours. Another case described a woman who was taken into Gaza with two young children but managed to return with them to Israeli territory.
Only at 1:53 p.m. did Israeli forces begin to enter the kibbutz in a coordinated manner, marking what the report described as a turning point in the battle. By then, much of the damage had already been done.
Residents and survivors criticized the findings, saying they do not go far enough in addressing responsibility. “Two and a half long years after October 7, the IDF investigation into that terrible day was presented to the public,” the kibbutz said in a statement. “We thank the army for conducting the investigation and acknowledging the failures and omissions — but for us, this is just another confirmation of the great omission of that morning.”
The community added: “On the morning of Black Sabbath, Kibbutz Holit was left without defense… This reality left the kibbutz’s residents to deal alone with a brutal attack.”
Calling for further accountability, residents demanded the establishment of a national inquiry. “The investigation is an important step in the process, but it is not the end of the story,” the statement said. “We demand that it be exhausted through a state investigation committee that will examine in depth all the failures and circumstances that led to the disaster and, most importantly, restore trust.”
The IDF has released a series of detailed internal probes examining how roughly 5,000 terrorists from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad were able to storm Israeli communities and overrun military positions. The reports reveal that the army’s chain of command collapsed amid the chaos as soldiers found themselves vastly outnumbered. Investigators concluded that the IDF misread Hamas’s intentions and misinterpreted intelligence warnings in the days leading up to October 7, while much of the military’s attention remained directed toward potential threats from Iran and its proxy Hezbollah in Lebanon.
However, an external review of 25 of the reports by a panel of former senior military officers found that many were incomplete or unsatisfactory.
The IDF’s probes only address issues of operations, intelligence, and command — not decisions made by the political echelon.
Around 1,200 people were killed, and 252 Israelis and foreigners were taken captive by Hamas during the October 7, 2023, attack on southern Israel.