State Comptroller: Israel Unprepared for PostOctober 7 Detention Surge

🔴 BREAKING: Published 3 hours ago
Israel's State Comptroller Matanyahu Englman criticized the government's post-October 7 detention handling, citing unpreparedness, a Hamas operative's release.

Jerusalem, 9 June, 2026 (TPS-IL) — Israel’s State Comptroller on Tuesday issued a sweeping report criticizing the government’s handling of security detainees following the October 7, 2023 Hamas massacre, saying Israel was dangerously unprepared for the surge in prisoners, that a high-profile Hamas operative was released without the Prime Minister’s knowledge, and that—more than two years after the attack—not a single perpetrator has been brought to trial.

“The State of Israel, which was already in a national detention crisis before the Iron Swords War broke out, found itself after the war’s outbreak in an acute detention crisis that further intensified the already existing crisis in the detention field, which damaged the required detention response in the face of the many terrorists who were captured,” State Comptroller Matanyahu Englman wrote.

The State Comptroller, Israel’s independent government oversight authority responsible for auditing public agencies and ministries, conducts regular reviews of state preparedness and the effectiveness of government policy.

The report examined the Israel Prison Service (IPS), the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and the justice system.

Pre-War Strain and Systemic Overcrowding

Even before Hamas terrorists stormed Israeli communities on October 7, Israel’s prison system was under strain. According to the report, as early as July 2022, the director-general of the Ministry for National Security warned that “the State of Israel is in the midst of a national detention crisis.”

On the eve of the war, prisons held about 16,200 inmates, compared to an official capacity of 14,500, according to the report.

The attack significantly worsened the situation. The security prisoner population nearly doubled—from approximately 5,200 before the war to around 10,000 by January 2025. Total detainees reached about 23,400, exceeding official capacity by 61%.

“The preparedness of the Ministry for National Security and the IPS to absorb enemy combatants in large numbers was not sufficient, and when the Iron Swords War broke out, the IPS did not have enough space to detain all of the security prisoners captured during the war,” the report said.

Detention Failures

The report also criticized the military, saying the IDF had not prepared estimates of expected arrest numbers before the war—despite being required to do so under its own operational directives—and only produced such estimates in October 2024, a year into the fighting. By February 2025, some 2,366 security prisoners remained in military facilities because the IPS could not absorb them. The IDF ultimately spent more than NIS 150 million ($51 million) constructing detention infrastructure it had formally relinquished two decades earlier.

One of the report’s most significant findings concerns the 2024 release of Muhammad Abu Salmiya, a confessed Hamas operative and director of the Shifa Hospital, Gaza’s largest medical facility. As the Tazpit Press Service reported in October 2023, Hamas used the medical center to hide Hamas leaders and hostages, launch rocket attacks, and torture suspected collaborators. It was later revealed that Hamas hoarded a half-million liters of fuel beneath the hospital. Salmiya was one of 19 detainees released under pressure to vacate the military’s Sde Teiman detention facility ahead of a Supreme Court deadline.

Before the release, a Shin Bet official noted the list included individuals “from whom a risk was posed.” The IDF acknowledged in its response that those freed were “individuals involved in terrorist activity who meet the criteria of the Unlawful Combatants Law”—meaning they should not have been released under the law’s own terms. However, Prime Minister Netanyahu was neither informed nor asked to approve the decision.

In the aftermath, the Prison Service and Shin Bet traded blame while the Prime Minister’s Office distanced itself from the affair.

The State Comptroller strongly criticized the fact that individuals assessed as posing a security risk were released without the Prime Minister being informed or approving the decision. The release triggered protests from hostage families and was later exploited by Hamas for propaganda purposes.

Justice Delayed

One of the report’s most significant findings is that, as of February 2026, “no Hamas Terrorist who participated in the terror attack on October 7 and during the Iron Swords War has been prosecuted for his crimes.” Netanyahu and Justice Minister Yoav Gallant had instructed prosecutors to hold off on charges while hostages remained in Gaza. Following a ceasefire and the return of all living hostages in late 2025, a prosecution law passed its first Knesset reading in January 2026.

The Comptroller warned that delay carries real costs, saying prosecution “will serve as deterrence for those who plan to carry out similar atrocities in the future” and that continued inaction “delays justice for the victims of the terrible massacre and their families.”

Among the report’s key recommendations, Englman called on the Prison Service and the military to complete joint planning for wartime detention scenarios based on realistic estimates; to establish clear criteria requiring prime ministerial approval before releasing detainees who pose security risks; and for the Justice Ministry to urgently finalize the legal framework needed to prosecute October 7 perpetrators without further delay.

The Military’s Response

In response to the report, the IDF said the Israel Prison Service bears full responsibility for the prolonged detention of security prisoners as the designated national prison authority by the political echelon. It said it was required under military orders and a joint framework with the IPS to hold detainees only for short periods, but that it established temporary detention facilities due to severe capacity shortages, which were ultimately used for extended detention.

Regarding detainee releases from Sde Teiman, the IDF said the decision was made following National Security Council discussions with all relevant bodies, based on a Shin Bet list and in accordance with legal procedures. It added that the Comptroller’s report contained “fundamental flaws,” including what it described as a lack of direct audit meetings with IDF officials.

On the release of Muhammad Abu Salmiya the IDF said the decision followed Shin Bet security assessments and National Security Council discussions, and that it was determined the head of the National Security Council — not the Prime Minister — was the designated official to be informed.

The military added that while it is cooperating with the State Comptroller, it disputes some of the report’s conclusions.